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Abstract
Recent literature has shown that the control of False Discovery Rate (FDR) for distributed detection
in wireless sensor networks (WSNs) can provide substantial improvement in detection performance over
conventional design methodologies. In this paper, we further investigate system design issues in FDR
based distributed detection. We demonstrate that improved system design may be achieved by employing
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov distance metric instead of the deflection coefficient, as originally proposed in
[1]. We also analyze the performance of FDR based distributed detection in the presence of Byzantines.
Byzantines are malicious sensors which send falsified information to the Fusion Center (FC) to deteriorate
system performance. We provide analytical and simulation results on the global detection probability as
a function of the fraction of Byzantines in the network. It is observed that the detection performance
degrades considerably when the fraction of Byzantines is large. Hence, we propose an adaptive algorithm
at the FC which learns the Byzantines’ behavior over time and changes the FDR parameter to overcome
the loss in detection performance. Detailed simulation results are provided to demonstrate the robustness
of the proposed adaptive algorithm to Byzantine attacks in WSNs.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have been employed extensively to monitor a region
of interest (ROI) for reliable detection/estimation/tracking of events [2]–[5]. In this paper, we focus on
distributed target detection in WSNs, which has been a very active area of research in the recent past.
In distributed detection [6], due to power and bandwidth constraints, each sensor, instead of sending its
raw data, sends quantized data (local decision) to a central observer or Fusion Center (FC). The FC
combines these local decisions based on a fusion rule to come up with a global decision. There has been
extensive research on distributed detection with fusion of local decisions [6]. Optimum fusion rules have
been derived for the distributed detection problem under various assumptions [7]–[11]. Most of these
fusion rules require complete knowledge of the local sensor performance metrics, such as the probability
of detection and false alarm. However, in large wireless sensor networks and under complex target signal
models, the local sensor performance metrics may not be known or may be very difficult to estimate.
To address the scenario of unknown local sensor performance metrics, in [12] [13], the authors have
proposed employing the total number of detections (also referred to as the count statistic) as a decision
statistic at the FC. The fusion rule based on the count statistic leads to a decision rule where the sensor
decisions are weighed equally, even though the SNR at each sensor may be different.
In general, obtaining the optimal local decision rules has been shown to be a very difficult problem [6]
[14]. Under the conditional independence assumption, it has been shown that the use of identical local
decision rules is optimal under asymptotic conditions (i.e., the number of sensors N →∞) [15]. Although
the optimality of identical decision rules does not hold in general [15] [6] [14], design of non-identical
decision rules is computationally very complex and researchers have generally employed identical decision
rules based on asymptotic optimality of identical decision rules. Recently, False Discovery Rate (FDR)
based distributed detection has been proposed by Ermis and Saligrama [16] and Ray and Varshney [17] [1].
In [1], the authors have proposed a scheme for distributed detection in WSNs based on the control of FDR.
It has been shown that under the assumption that the FC employs a test statistic which is linear in count
(count here refers to the total number of detections) to reach the global decision, control of the FDR leads
to non-identical local decision rules and provides significant improvement over the system with identical
decision rules. This scheme provides significant improvement in the global detection performance [1]. In
[1], the authors suggest maximization of the deflection coefficient to obtain the FDR design parameter.
However, as the count statistic is non-Gaussian in general, maximization of the deflection coefficient
does not guarantee optimal global performance [18]. In this paper, we further consider the problem of
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FDR based distributed detection and demonstrate that improved system performance may be achieved
via optimization of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov distance instead of the deflection coefficient.
Most of the research in the field of distributed detection has been carried out under the assumption of
a secure network. Only in the recent past, researchers have investigated the problem of security threats
[19] on sensor networks. In this paper, we focus on one particular class of security attacks, known as the
Byzantine attack [20]–[23] (also referred to as the Data Falsification Attack). Byzantine attack involves
malicious sensors within the network which send false information to the FC to disrupt the global decision
making process. Byzantines intend to deteriorate the detection performance of the network by suitably
modifying their decisions before transmission to the FC. Marano et al. [20] first considered the distributed
detection problem in the presence of Byzantines under the assumption that the Byzantines have perfect
knowledge of the underlying true hypothesis. In [20], the authors also presented the optimal attacking
distributions for the Byzantines such that the detection error exponent is minimized at the FC. Rawat et
al. in [21] considered the more practical case when the Byzantines did not have the knowledge of the
underlying true hypothesis and also proposed a simple algorithm at the FC to identify the Byzantines in
the network. In [24], stochastic resonance [25] [26] was employed to mitigate the effect of Byzantines in
a distributed inference network. In our previous work [23], we have also analyzed localization in WSNs
in the presence of Byzantines and proposed mitigation techniques to make the Byzantines ‘ineffective’. In
this paper, we study the performance of the FDR based distributed detection framework in the presence
of Byzantines. It is observed that the global detection performance deteriorates rapidly when the fraction
of Byzantine sensors increases. Hence, we propose a novel algorithm at the FC, based on a modified
Kolmogorov goodness-of-fit test, which detects the fraction of Byzantines present in the network and
adaptively changes the FDR parameter to improve the detection performance.
The key contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
• We propose maximization of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov distance instead of the deflection coefficient to
obtain the FDR design parameter and demonstrate that it considerably improves system performance.
• We define a Byzantine attack model and show that the FDR value is controlled even in the presence
of Byzantines; however the local sensor detection performance deteriorates considerably when the
fraction of Byzantines is large.
• We next study the performance of FDR based distributed detection in the presence of Byzantine
attacks and provide analytical and simulation results on the effect of Byzantines on global detection
performance.
• Finally, we propose an algorithm which adaptively changes the system parameters by learning the
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Byzantines’ behavior over time and demonstrate that the proposed algorithm provides improved
system performance in the presence of Byzantines.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we introduce the system model and
the assumptions made in the paper. We also formally define False Discovery Rate (FDR) and briefly
discuss the FDR based distributed detection scheme proposed in [1]. We propose some changes to the
system design algorithm proposed in [1] and show the improvement in system performance in Section
III. In Section IV, we show the performance degradation of FDR based schemes in the presence of
Byzantines. We show that although the FDR value is maintained at the specified value, the power of
the test reduces. We provide analytical results on the performance of FDR based distributed detection in
the presence of Byzantines in Section V. We propose an approximation to the optimal parameter design
approach which is computationally efficient and building on it, propose the adaptive distributed detection
scheme in Section VI. We conclude with a discussion on possible future directions in Section VII.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. System Model
We consider a parallel fusion network where N sensors are randomly deployed in the Region of
Interest (ROI). Each sensor receives noisy target signals, si (for i = 1, 2, ..., N ) and makes a decision bi
regarding the presence/absence of the target, which is then transmitted to the FC. The FC makes a global
decision (b0 ∈ {1, 0}) regarding the presence/absence of the target using the transmitted local decisions
{bi}i=1,...,N . We assume that the channels between the local sensors and the FC are ideal (for results
on distributed detection with imperfect channels, see [27], [28], and references therein). We consider the
presence of M = αN (0 ≤ α ≤ 1) Byzantines in the network. These Byzantines’ aim is to send falsified
information to the FC and deteriorate the detection performance. Their model and attack strategy would
be described later in Section IV.
As discussed earlier, due to the bandwidth and energy constraints, each local sensor sends a binary
decision (0/1) to the FC based on a local hypothesis test. The local sensor’s hypothesis test can be
formulated as follows:
H0 : si = ni : Target absent (1)
H1 : si = ai + ni : Target present (2)
where ai =
√
Pi is the signal amplitude received at the ith sensor due to the presence of the target and
ni ∈ N (0, 1) represent i.i.d. Gaussian noise. In this paper, we assume that the signal power received due
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to that emitted by the target drops to zero outside its finite radius of influence (d0). The general signal
model used is
Pi = g(di) (3)
where Pi is the signal power received at the ith sensor which is at a distance di from the target. As
discussed above, the following g(·) has been used in this paper:
g(x) =


P0, if 0 ≤ x ≤ d0
0, if x > d0
(4)
The above model is adopted primarily for analytical convenience; however the results provided in this
paper may be easily extended to more complex target signal models, such as where the target signal
decays exponentially or in an inverse square manner with distance.
The FC makes a global decision based on the vector of local decisions b = (b1, · · · , bN ) received from
all the sensors. The binary hypothesis testing problem at the FC is
G0 : P (b;G0) : Target absent (5)
G1 : P (b;G1) : Target present (6)
where, P (b;G0) and P (b;G1) are the distributions of b in the absence of the target (G0) in the ROI and
in the presence of the target (G1) in the ROI respectively.
Conventionally, for the distributed detection problem, identical decision rules are used at the local
sensors. However in [1], FDR based non-identical sensor decision rules have been proposed and shown
to be superior to identical decision rules. In the next subsections, we introduce the concept of FDR and
provide a brief description of FDR based distributed detection.
B. False Discovery Rate (FDR)
In statistical hypothesis testing, when a family of tests (e.g., multiple binary hypothesis tests) are
conducted, it is often meaningful to define an error rate for the family of tests instead for an individual
test. Family wide error rate (FWER) [29] is perhaps the most popular error rate used in the literature. It
is defined as the probability of committing any type I error or false alarm. If the error rate for each test
is β then the FWER βF for k tests is
βF = P (F ≥ 1) = 1− (1− β)k (7)
where F is the total number of false alarms. As can be seen from (7), as the number of tests k increases,
β remains constant but βF increases. This is a fundamental problem in Multiple Comparison Procedures
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(MCP) and classical comparison procedures aim to control this error measure. Bonferroni procedure [30]
is a widely employed procedure to control the FWER at a desired rate, but it results in significantly
reduced power (probability of detection). A radically different and more liberal approach proposed by
Benjamini and Hochberg [31] controls the FDR, defined as the fraction of false rejections among those
hypotheses rejected. Formally, FDR is defined as the expected ratio of the number of false alarms (declared
H1 when H0 is true) to the total number of detections (H1 declarations consisting of both true and false
detections).
TABLE I: Notations to define FDR
Declared H0 Declared H1 Total
H0 true W F N0
H1 true T S N −N0
Total N −R R N
From Table I, the ratio of false alarms to the total number of detections can be viewed as the random
variable,
A =


F
F+S if F + S 6= 0
0 if F + S = 0
(8)
FDR is defined to be the expectation of A,
FDR = E(A) (9)
This metric was proposed by Benjamini and Hochberg [31] along with the following centralized
algorithm to control FDR for multiple comparisons.
Algorithm to control FDR: Suppose p1, p2, · · · , pN are the p-values for N tests and p(1), p(2), · · · , p(N)
denote the ordered p-values. The p-value for an observation si is defined as
pi =
∫ ∞
si
f0(s)ds (10)
where, f0(s) is the probability density function of the observation under H0. The algorithm by Benjamini
and Hochberg [31] which keeps the FDR below a value γ, is provided below.
1. Calculate the p-values of all the observations and arrange them in ascending order.
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2. Let d be the largest i for which p(i) ≤ iγ/N .
3. Declare all observations corresponding to p(i), i = 1, · · · , d, as H1.
Under the assumption of independence of test statistics corresponding to the true null hypotheses (H0),
this procedure controls the FDR at γ. Note that the FDR based decision making system looks for the
largest index i = d such that p(d) ≤ dγ/N . There may be other indices i = l, where l < d for which the
condition p(l) ≤ lγ/N may be true, but the FDR based decision system looks for the largest value of i
for which this is true. The reason behind this, as discussed in [31] and subsequently pointed out in [1],
is to achieve the largest probability of detection while constraining the FDR to less than or equal to γ.
Further discussion including the proof of this algorithm is omitted for the brevity of the paper and may
be found in [31].
Application of the above algorithm for a multi-sensor signal detection framework requires the central-
ized ordering of p-values at the FC. As discussed earlier, for a distributed detection problem, due to the
energy and communication constraints, local sensors send quantized information, and often only send
one bit to the FC. Hence, a distributed ordering scheme of the p-values is necessary. Ray & Varshney [1]
have proposed a decentralized FDR procedure based on a feedback mechanism which in effect orders
p-values at the sensors. This distributed algorithm achieves the same performance as the Benjamini and
Hochberg centralized procedure. The algorithm and further discussion may be found in [1].
III. FDR BASED DISTRIBUTED DETECTION
In this section, we summarize the design guidelines for FDR based distributed detection proposed in
[1] and show that system design needs to be re-visited. The design parameters in a FDR based distributed
detection system [1] are γ and TFDR, where γ is the FDR parameter and TFDR is the global threshold.
The system-wide probability of false alarm for the FDR based distributed detection system is given by,
PFA = P (∆ > TFDR;G0) + κP (∆ = TFDR;G0) (11)
where κ is the randomization parameter. Similarly, the system-wide probability of detection is given by
PD = P (∆ > TFDR;G1) + κP (∆ = TFDR;G1) (12)
where the probability mass function (pmf) of the count statistic is given by Propositions 2 and 4 of [1].
It has been shown in [1] that determination of the optimal value of the FDR parameter γ, where
optimality is with respect to system-level detection performance is a difficult problem. Optimizing the
ROC, i.e., finding the optimal values of the parameter by maximizing the detection probability for a fixed
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false alarm probability, via simulation or numerical computation is very complex (see [1] for further
discussion). A computationally less intensive approach is to use distance measure based optimization for
system design. Motivated by this, in [1], optimization of deflection coefficient of the count statistic (∆)
was employed to find the optimal value of γ. Intuitively, an increased deflection coefficient generally
implies greater separation between the pmfs of the count statistic under global hypotheses G0 and G1 and
is likely to lead to better detector performance. Also, the asymptotic distribution of the count statistic is
Gaussian for which it is known that maximization of the deflection coefficient leads to an optimal detector
[18]. However, in this paper, we show that maximization of the deflection coefficient may not be the best
design criterion for FDR based detection system under non-asymptotic conditions. Since the distribution
of the count statistic (∆) is non-Gaussian in general, it is likely that the deflection coefficient fails to
characterize its performance completely. We study the performance of several candidate distance measures
(such as Kullback-Leibler Divergence, Bhattacharya Distance and Kolmogorov-Smirnov Distance) for
system design.
As a motivating example, we perform the following simulation. Let N = 20 sensors be randomly
distributed within the circular ROI of radius R = 10. The pdf of the sensor locations r (r is measured
from the target location) is given by fR(r) = 2r/R2, 0 ≤ r ≤ R. The optimal value of parameter γ
(which maximizes the detection probability) obtained for a target model with power P0 = 5 and radius of
influence d0 = 5 depends on the system-wide probability of false alarm, PFA. For PFA = 0.1, the optimal
parameter value that maximizes PD is found to be γopt = 0.25. However, when deflection coefficient is
used, we get the optimal parameter value as γdopt = 0.008. The optimization has been done numerically
through simulations and the plots have been omitted for the sake of brevity of the paper.
The above example shows that the deflection coefficient does not always yield the optimal value of
the parameter and as shown can deviate substantially from the optimal value. This makes it necessary
to come up with a distance measure which is computationally more efficient than using ROC based
optimization, and provides a better approximation to the optimal solution. In this paper, we present
some comparative performance results between four candidate measures: Deflection Coefficient [12],
Kullback-Leibler Divergence [32], Bhattacharya Distance and Kolmogorov-Smirnov Distance [33]. Table
II compares the optimal parameter values found by the optimization of each of the distance measures
against the true optimal value found by ROC based optimization (PD maximization while fixing PFA =
0.1) for FDR based threshold design scheme.
For the example considered, as can be seen from Table II, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Distance (KSD)
best approximates the optimal parameter value compared to other candidate measures for the FDR based
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TABLE II: Threshold Comparison using different distance measures
Metrics FDR based threshold scheme (γ)
ROC based optimization 0.25
Deflection Coefficient optimization 0.008
Kullback-Leibler Divergence optimization 0.15
Bhattacharya Distance optimization 0.2
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Distance optimization 0.2
scheme. We ran a large number of simulation experiments and similar results were obtained. The deflection
coefficient fails to find the optimal parameter value as it only looks at the first and the second moments of
the distributions which is not sufficient when the underlying distribution is non-Gaussian. In our context,
the count statistic (∆) is non-Gaussian and is a discrete RV and, therefore, deflection coefficient does
not characterize the distribution of count statistic. In the remainder of this section, we formally define
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov distance and perform some empirical studies based on K-S distance to find the
optimal parameter value for the FDR based distributed detection scheme.
Definition The Kolmogorov-Smirnov distance (K-S distance) is defined as the maximum value of the
absolute difference between two cumulative distribution functions [33].
The Kolmogorov Smirnov distance measures the distance between the empirical distribution function
of the sample data and the cumulative distribution function of the reference distribution. The K-S distance
is distribution free, i.e., it makes no assumptions about the underlying data distributions. The K-S distance
between two cdfs F (·) and G(·) is defined as
KSD(F (·), G(·)) = sup
0≤x≤1
|F (x)−G(x)| (13)
In our context, F (·) and G(·) represent the cdfs of the count statistic (∆) under global hypotheses
G0 and G1. The optimal parameter value of the local decision threshold parameter (γ for FDR based
scheme) is found by maximizing the K-S distance.
It is important to note here that the optimal parameter value depends on the system requirement of
system-wide probability of false alarm (PFA). When PFA = 0.2 is used, the optimal parameter value
based on ROC optimization comes out to be γ = 0.2 which again is close to the optimal parameter value
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found by using the K-S distance measure for optimization. Fig. 1 shows the ROCs obtained by using the
parameters obtained by K-S distance optimization and deflection coefficient optimization for the FDR
based scheme. Note that in Fig. 1, the ROC obtained by deflection coefficient optimization is not as good
as the ROC obtained by using K-S distance optimization.
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
Pfa
P d
 
 
KS distance optimization
Deflection coefficient optimization
Fig. 1: ROC using the optimal parameter values found using K-S distance and deflection coefficient
From empirical studies, K-S distance optimization seems to provide a good approximation to the
optimal value. We hypothesize that since K-S distance measures the overlap between the distributions
and is distribution free in nature, it provides better results compared to deflection coefficient maximization.
However, to find the best distance measure to use is an interesting but difficult problem to solve
considering the large number of candidate measures available in the literature (Ali-Silvey Distance
Measures [34]). We leave this for future work and for the remaining part of the paper, we use K-S
distance or ROC based optimization to find the optimal value of the local threshold parameter.
IV. CONTROL OF FDR IN THE PRESENCE OF BYZANTINES
In this section, we consider the problem of FDR based distributed detection in the presence of
Byzantines. We first show the effect of Byzantines on the control of FDR in multiple comparison problems
and in subsequent sections analyze the effect of Byzantines on FDR based distributed detection.
Byzantines are the local sensors which send falsified information to the FC to deteriorate system
performance. Since control of FDR is based on p-values, the Byzantines’ attack strategy would be to
report the decision based on a transformed p-value denoted by qi = h(pi), where h(·) is a transformation
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used by the Byzantines and pi is the true p-value of the ith sensor. The transformation h(·) needs to
satisfy the properties listed below:
1. h(·) should be a function whose domain and range are [0, 1], i.e., h : [0, 1] → [0, 1]
2. h(·) should be a decreasing function. This property is essential since the Byzantines’ aim is to
deteriorate detection performance [20]. As the p-value represents the ‘confidence’ of the target
being absent, they would like to report falsified information by reversing it. A decreasing function
ensures a higher q-value for a lower p-value and vice-versa.
One possible transformation is the linearly decreasing function h(p) = 1 − p, which is analogous
to flipping of the local decision. The transformation corresponding to flipping has been shown to be
the optimal attack for Byzantines in distributed detection using identical local decision rules [21] and
target localization with quantized data [23]. Also, as shown later in this section, the above transformation
ensures that the Byzantines attack the network in a covert manner. This attack strategy reduces the
detection performance of the network (refer to Fig. 4) while controlling the FDR value at the pre-
determined threshold γ (refer to Fig. 2). Hence, the attack strategy h(p) = 1− p allows the Byzantines
to reduce the network performance while not changing their behavior in a manner that can be detected
by observers such as the FC.
In the remainder of this paper, we use the above transformation to model the Byzantine attack.
Therefore, if pi represents the true p-value of the ith sensor, then the transformed p-values are given
by
qi =


pi, if ith sensor is honest
1− pi, if ith sensor is Byzantine
(14)
In the rest of the section, we show the effect of Byzantines on the control of FDR. As mentioned
previously, an important aspect of FDR based distributed detection is the control of FDR value at the
pre-determined threshold γ. The FDR control algorithm provided earlier in Section II-B, controls the
FDR value at γ when the true Hypothesis is H0 and at a value less than or equal to γ when the true
Hypothesis is H1. We now prove that the FDR value is controlled even in the presence of Byzantines.
Proposition IV.1. Let N sensors be randomly deployed in the ROI. The local sensors report local
decisions to the FC based on their p-values and the FC makes the final decision regarding the pres-
ence/absence of the target using these local decisions. Let there be M Byzantines in the network which
transform the p-values according to (14) and report decisions based on the transformed p-values. For
independent local sensors under global hypothesis G0, the FDR control algorithm proposed in [31]
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controls the FDR value at the pre-determined threshold γ, even in the presence of Byzantines.
Proof: In order to prove this proposition, we need to find the distribution of p-values under H0
in the presence of Byzantines. The Byzantines’ model used in this paper is that of transforming the
p-values according to (14). When the Byzantines are absent, the true p-value represents the cumulative
distribution function under H0 and, therefore, follows uniform distribution. Since the Byzantines’ effect
is a transformation given by (14), the distribution of the falsified p-values under H0 can be found by
the transformation of random variables V = 1 − U . Due to probability integral transform, the falsified
p-values also follow uniform distribution under null hypothesis.
The proof of this proposition then follows from the straightforward observation that the FDR algorithm
proposed by Benjamini and Hochberg [31] controls the FDR value for any configuration (distribution) of
the false null hypothesis. The condition that p-values are uniformly distributed under true null hypothesis
is still satisfied and since the proof does not depend on the p-values’ distribution under H1, the FDR
value is controlled at the pre-determined threshold.
We now validate via simulations that the FDR value is controlled at γ even in the presence of
Byzantines. Fig. 2 shows the FDR value under both the hypotheses G0 and G1 with varying fraction of
Byzantines (α) present in the network. Let us consider a distributed detection system with the parameters:
N = 20, R = 10, d0 = 5, P0 = 5 and the FDR parameter γ = 0.25. The simulation results are for
5× 104 Monte-Carlo runs. As can be seen from the figure, the FDR value is maintained at γ under G0
and at a value less than or equal to γ under G1 even in the presence of Byzantines.
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Fig. 2: FDR value against the fraction of Byzantines
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Fig. 3: p-values against linearly increasing threshold in the presence of target
This ineffectiveness of Byzantines on the FDR value is expected because the effect of Byzantines
changes the order of the transformed p-values (q-values) and the largest threshold crossing index would
be different as compared to the largest threshold crossing index for the original p-values. In other words,
in the presence of a target, most of the true p-values are small and therefore the threshold crossing would
be closer to the right extremal resulting in a high number of detections as depicted by an example in Fig.
3a. In the presence of Byzantines, the p-values get transformed as defined by (14) and the transformed
p-values (q-values) become larger and the threshold crossing shifts to the left, as shown in Fig. 3b. This
reduces the number of detections and it is equivalent to looking at an earlier threshold crossing index for
the true p-values. As pointed out in Section II-B, the FDR algorithm looks at the largest index satisfying
p(i) ≤ iγ/N to maximize the power of the test. Observe that when α = 1, i.e., all the sensors are
Byzantines, the order of the q-values is reversed as compared to the p-values and the FDR algorithm
based on the q-values ends up looking at the smallest index of p-values satisfying p(i) ≤ iγ/N rather
than the largest index. Under this observation, we conjecture that for 0 < α < 1, the FDR algorithm
based on the q-values ends up looking at an index of p-value between the largest and the smallest indices
satisfying p(i) ≤ iγ/N . Since the proof of control of FDR does not depend on whether it is the largest
threshold crossing index or not, the FDR value is maintained at the required threshold. However, the
power of the test degrades in the presence of Byzantines.
In the above discussion, we have shown that the FDR value is not affected by the presence of
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Byzantines. However, it was also pointed out that the FDR control algorithm for the transformed p-values
(q-values) is equivalent to looking at an earlier index on the true p-values. In the presence of Byzantines,
the number of detections is reduced and, therefore, the distribution of count (number of detections) under
G1 is now closer to the distribution of the count statistic under G0 which remains unchanged in the
presence of Byzantines. This makes it difficult to distinguish between the two hypotheses. Fig. 4 shows
the effect of Byzantines on the average number of detections reported by the local sensors. The simulation
parameters are the same as before: N = 20, R = 10, d0 = 5, P0 = 5 and the FDR parameter γ = 0.25.
The plots are for 5× 104 Monte-Carlo runs and it can be observed that, in the presence of Byzantines,
the number of detections remains the same under G0 but reduces under G1. When α approaches ‘1’, all
the sensors are Byzantines and their local hypotheses are effectively reversed. Therefore, at α = 1, the
average number of detections is lower under G1 than the value under G0.
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Fig. 4: Average number of detections against the fraction of Byzantines
In the following section, we explore this intuitive observation that the Byzantines bring the distribution
of the count statistic under G1 closer to its distribution under G0 in the context of FDR based distributed
detection. We show analytically the effect of Byzantines on the count statistic and derive the distributions
of the count statistic under G0 and G1.
V. FDR BASED DISTRIBUTED DETECTION IN THE PRESENCE OF BYZANTINES
In order to understand the behavior of FDR based distributed detection scheme in the presence of
Byzantines, we require the knowledge regarding the pmf of the count statistic (∆) in the presence of
Byzantines. These results are provided in the rest of this section.
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A. Probability mass function of the Count Statistic (∆)
Let the observed p-values be denoted by the random variables {Ui}i=1,...,N and the transformed p-
values (q-values) be denoted by the transformed random variables {Vi}i=1,...,N where the transformation
is as follows
Vi =


Ui if i is an honest sensor
1− Ui if i is a Byzantine sensor
(15)
Proposition V.1. The probability of ∆= i local false alarms (count) for N sensors containing M = αN
Byzantines in the ROI, and control of FDR at γ under G0 (absence of target in the ROI) is given by
P (∆ = i;G0) =
(
N
i
)
(1− γ)
( iγ
N
)i(
1− iγ
N
)N−i−1
(16)
In the absence of a target, the p-values of both the Byzantines and the honest nodes are uniformly
distributed, that is both Ui and Vi are uniformly distributed. Therefore, the result remains the same as
derived by Finner and Roters [35] using Dempster’s formula for barrier crossing for uniform random
variables, irrespective of the presence of Byzantines. Similarly, the asymptotic distribution can be found
as
lim
N→∞
P (∆ = i;G0) =
ii
i!
(1− γ)γi exp (−iγ) (17)
Proposition V.2. The probability of ∆ = i local detections (count) for N sensors containing M = αN
Byzantine sensors in the ROI, and control of FDR at γ under G1 (presence of target in ROI) is given by
P (∆ = i;G1) =
1(N
M
)∑∫ 1
vN,N=γ
· · ·
∫ vi+2,N
vi+1,N=(i+1)γ/N
∫ iγ/N
vi,N=0
· · ·
∫ v2,N
v1,N=0
N !fV1(v1)fV2(v2) · · · fVN (vN )dv1,Ndv2,N · · · dvN,N (18)
Also, asymptotically, i.e., for large N,
P (∆ = i;G1) =
min (M,i)∑
k=max (0,M−N+i)
(
M
k
)(
N −M
i− k
)
(p¯BD)
k(1− p¯BD)M−k(p¯HD)i−k(1− p¯HD)(N−M)−(i−k)
(19)
or
P (∆ = i;G1) =
(
N
i
)
(p¯D)
i(1− p¯D)N−i (20)
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where p¯HD is the average probability of reporting ‘1’ under G1 for an honest local sensor, p¯BD is the
average probability of reporting ‘1’ under G1 for a Byzantine local sensor and p¯D = αp¯BD + (1−α)p¯HD
is the average probability of reporting ‘1’ under G1.
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix A
It is interesting to observe here that the Byzantines only affect the pmf of the count statistic (∆) under
G1, while the pmf under G0 remains the same. The reason behind this is that the p-values under G0 are
uniformly distributed and a transformation h(p) = 1−p = q still keeps the q-values uniformly distributed
under G0. However, the pmf under G1 changes as the p-values are no longer uniformly distributed.
B. Numerical Results
In this section, we provide numerical and simulation results to validate the analytical expressions
obtained for the pmf of the count statistic under FDR based threshold design. Tables III, IV and V show
the numerical and simulation results of analytically derived P (∆ = i;G1) for the FDR based scheme
for different values of α. The signal and target parameters are: P0 = 3, R = 10, d0 = 3, N = 4 and
FDR parameter γ = 0.1. The integrals given in (18) have been evaluated using Monte Carlo integration
methods [36]. The simulation results are for 5 × 105 Monte Carlo runs. These tables show that the
numerical and simulation results match very closely. Also observe that the probability that count is ‘0’,
P (∆ = 0;G1), increases with α while P (∆ = i;G1) for i 6= 0 decreases with α, suggesting a shift of
the distribution towards ‘0’.
TABLE III: Numerical and Simulation results for P (∆ = i;G1) for control of FDR when α = 0
Count 0 1 2 3 4
P (∆;G1) (Numerical) 0.7777 0.1777 0.0407 0.0061 3.1544 x 10−4
P (∆;G1) (Simulations) 0.7756 0.1773 0.0401 0.0065 5.1000 x 10−4
TABLE IV: Numerical and Simulation results for P (∆ = i;G1) for control of FDR when α = 0.5
Count 0 1 2 3 4
P (∆;G1) (Numerical) 0.8355 0.1347 0.0227 0.0027 1.8121 x 10−4
P (∆;G1) (Simulations) 0.8383 0.1353 0.0233 0.0028 1.7000 x 10−4
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TABLE V: Numerical and Simulation results for P (∆ = i;G1) for control of FDR when α = 1
Count 0 1 2 3 4
P (∆;G1) (Numerical) 0.9022 0.0789 0.0106 0.0012 6.2896 x 10−5
P (∆;G1) (Simulations) 0.9084 0.0793 0.0111 0.0011 6.4000 x 10−5
In Fig. 5, we provide the simulation results and the analytical approximation for the pmf of the count
statistic P (∆;G1) for a large number of sensors in the ROI. The simulation parameters are N = 500,
P0 = 15, R = 10, d0 = 3 and FDR parameter γ = 0.0077. The simulation results are for 5× 104 Monte
Carlo runs. The simulation results demonstrate that the asymptotic expressions for P (∆;G1) match the
simulation results very well. Again note that the distributions move closer to ‘0’ as α increases suggesting
a decrease in the number of detections.
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Fig. 5: Simulated and analytical results for P (∆;G1) for the FDR based scheme under asymptotic
conditions when α = 0.1, 0.4, 0.8
Fig. 8 shows the reduction in detection performance with an increase in the number of Byzantines in
the network. The simulation parameters are: R = 10, d0 = 5, P0 = 5, N = 20, system-wide probability
of false alarm is fixed at PFA = 0.1. This yields optimal FDR parameter as γ = 0.25. The simulation
results are for 1 × 104 Monte-Carlo runs. This shows that the Byzantines reduce the power of the test
(detection probability) even though the FDR value is maintained at the prescribed threshold. This leads
to the interesting question regarding the optimality of the current transformation h(·) for the Byzantines.
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This analysis is much more complex and will be explored in the future.
We also compared the detection performance of FDR based threshold scheme and identical threshold
based scheme in the presence of Byzantines. In our previous work [1], we have shown that the FDR
based threshold scheme performs better than the identical threshold scheme in the absence of Byzantines.
Identical threshold scenario under Byzantine attack has been investigated by us [21]. The identical
threshold on the observations is represented as τ or, equivalently, the threshold on the p-values is
pfa = Q(τ). We skip the details of the optimal threshold (τ or pfa) design since it is not the focus
of this paper1. However, we present a numerical comparison of the two schemes. Fig. 6 presents a
comparison of the two schemes when the fraction of Byzantines, α = 0.4. The simulation parameters
are: N = 20, R = 10, d0 = 5, P0 = 5, the optimal FDR parameter γ = 0.1 and the optimal identical
threshold parameter Q(τ) = pfa = 0.005.
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Fig. 6: ROC using the optimal parameter values found using K-S distance when α = 0.4
VI. ADAPTIVE FDR BASED DISTRIBUTED DETECTION
In this section, we first demonstrate that the optimal value of the design parameter for FDR based
scheme depends on the fraction of Byzantines (α). If prior information is available regarding α, we
can design our system such that the performance is optimized for the given value of α. However, in a
1Details of optimal design under identical threshold design in the presence of Byzantines will be published as a technical
report.
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dynamically changing environment, it becomes important that we learn this fraction (α) over time and
change our system design parameter values adaptively. In this section, we propose an adaptive algorithm
which learns the maliciousness of network over time and changes the values of design parameters to
improve the system’s detection performance in a dynamic manner. In other words, we learn the effect of
Byzantines on the network and reduce their effect by adaptively changing the values of system parameters.
A. Design of optimal parameter value
In this subsection, we first give design guidelines for FDR based distributed detection in the presence
of Byzantines. For a fixed system-wide probability of false alarm given by
PFA = P (∆ > T ;G0) + κP (∆ = T ;G0) (21)
where T is the global threshold for the count statistic used at the FC and κ is the randomization parameter,
the optimal value of local threshold parameter γ is found by maximizing the system-wide probability of
detection (PD). PD is given by
PD = P (∆ > T ;G1) + κP (∆ = T ;G1) (22)
where the pmf of the count statistic is given by Propositions V.1 and V.2. As can be seen from Proposition
V.1, the distribution of the count statistic under G0 does not depend on α and, therefore, the expression
of PFA remains the same irrespective of the value of α. In this section, we show through simulations that
the optimal parameter value for FDR based approach varies with α. Intuitively, the Byzantines decrease
the distance (such as KL divergence or KS distance) between the pmfs of the count statistic under global
hypotheses G0 and G1. It is, therefore, important to re-optimize the values of local threshold parameters
to increase the distance between these pmfs as much as possible for this fixed value of α.
For system and target parameters given by N = 20, R = 10, P0 = 5, d0 = 5 and PFA = 0.1, we have
shown in Section III that the optimal value of local threshold parameter is γ = 0.25 for the FDR based
scheme. For the FDR based algorithm, the optimal values of γ changes with α from γlow = 0.25 to
γhigh = 0.1 as shown in Fig. 7. The simulations were performed for several values of α ranging between
0 and 1 but a number of curves have been omitted for the sake of brevity.
From extensive simulations, it was observed that the optimal parameter value remains nearly constant
for different intervals of α. In the particular example chosen, for α ≤ 0.2, γopt = γlow = 0.25 and
for α > 0.2, γopt = γhigh = 0.1. Using the optimal parameter values, we determine the probability
of detection as a function of α via simulation. Fig. 8 shows the improvement in detection performance
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Fig. 7: Probability of detection versus FDR local parameter γ when PFA = 0.1 and for varying α
of the FDR based scheme using adaptive optimal parameter values. From Fig. 8, we can also observe
that the FDR based scheme using fixed parameter values fails under severe Byzantine attack (α = 1)
since it performs worse than a random decision making mechanism which gives PD = PFA. However,
under severe attack, the adaptive FDR based scheme becomes equivalent to this random decision making
mechanism with probability of detection being equal to the probability of false alarm. This value of
Byzantine fraction is analogous to αblind used in the literature [21], which is the fraction of Byzantines
needed to make the two hypotheses indistinguishable. For a typical distributed detection system, this
value has been shown to be 0.5 under the assumption of identical sensor decision rules. Our present
results show that the FDR based scheme has a higher blinding fraction (αblind = 1) which shows the
robustness of the FDR based distributed detection framework.
Since we have shown that the optimal parameter value depends on the fraction of Byzantines present in
the network, it becomes important to learn this parameter to adapt the system using the parameters at hand
(local thresholds). We use a modified Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test, proposed in the following sub-section,
to learn the fraction of Byzantines present in the network.
B. Modified Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test [37] is a goodness-of-fit test which compares a sample observed
data with a reference null hypothesis distribution. It quantifies a distance metric (Kolmogorov-Smirnov
distance) between the sample empirical cumulative distribution function (cdf) and the null hypothesis cdf
to decide the goodness-of-fit. It is typically used only for continuous cdfs but Conover [38] has extended
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Fig. 8: Probability of detection against the fraction of Byzantines when the true hypothesis is G1
this to cover the case of discontinuous cdfs. Since the only information known to the FC at every time
instant is the count statistic (∆), a goodness-of-fit test on the count statistic has to be used to decide the
range of α.
Description of the test [38]: Let X1, X2,· · · , Xn represent a random sample of size n. Denote the
null hypothesis by
K0 : F (x) = H(x) for all x, (23)
where F (x) is the unknown population distribution function, and H(x) is the hypothesized distribution
function with all parameters specified. H(x) may be continuous, discrete, or a mixture of the two types.
Let Sn(x) represent the empirical distribution function,
Sn(x) =
1
n
(the number of Xi’s which are ≤ x), for all x. (24)
The algorithm proposed by Conover [38] gives a critical value of the sample which quantifies the
confidence of null hypothesis being true. The test statistic D is defined as
D = sup
x
|H(x)− Sn(x)| (25)
In our case, since the optimal parameter value remains relatively fixed over different regions of α,
we can approximate it by a staircase function. If Q is the number of regions of α, we have a Q-ary
hypothesis test. We compare the sample with the distribution of the count statistic under each of these
regions
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Ki : P (∆;G1) for α = αi for i = 1, · · · , Q (26)
where Q is the number of regions and αi represents the ith region of α.
Here, we modify the algorithm provided by Conover [38] to generate test statistics Di for each of the
hypotheses (Ki). Since we have the distribution of the count statistic for each of the hypotheses (using
the analytical expressions derived in Section V-A), we can find the test statistics under all the hypotheses
using the given sample data. We then decide the hypothesis Hi for which the Di is larger. The advantage
of using the K-S test is that it performs well even with relatively small number of samples (e.g., 20-30
samples) compared to Pearson’s Chi-Square test [39] which requires a larger number of samples.
C. Adaptive Algorithm
In this subsection, we propose an adaptive algorithm based on the modified K-S test described above.
In this algorithm, at every time instant t, the FC stores the count value of the previous T0 time instants for
which the global decision of G1 was made. Using these T0 data samples, it makes a decision regarding
the region in which α lies using the modified K-S test described in Section VI-B. Depending on the
decision made, it changes the detector parameter values. Let Ki denote the decision made using the
modified K-S test, then the detector parameter values are changed to γ = γi, T = Ti, κ = κi. The global
threshold parameters (T, κ) may also need to be changed in order to maintain the system-wide false
alarm probability PFA at the desired value.
We now provide simulation results of our proposed adaptive algorithm. The system and target param-
eters are: N = 20, R = 10, P0 = 5, d0 = 5 and PFA = 0.1. This gives us the optimal FDR parameter
values varying in Q = 2 regions. The optimal parameter values are γ1 = 0.25 and γ2 = 0.1. For the
K-S hypothesis test, we have used T0 = 30 samples and the distributions for α1 = 0 and α2 = 0.5
under the two hypotheses have been found using (18) given in Section V-A. The system is initially
Byzantine free, i.e., α = 0. At t = 30, α changes to 0.7. In Fig. 9, the global detection probability is
plotted against time for the proposed adaptive algorithm and a non-adaptive algorithm which continues
to use the initial detector parameters. As can be observed, the detection performance improves when the
adaptive algorithm is used.
It is important to note that in the above example there were two regions for α. However, the basic
idea of learning α can be used when there are Q regions for α.
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Fig. 9: Probability of detection versus time when α changes from 0 to 0.7 at t = 30
VII. DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss the results presented in this paper with a focus on their implications and some
implementation issues. We considered the problem of FDR based distributed detection in the presence
of Byzantines. We first re-visited the work of [1] and observed that deflection coefficient is not the best
heuristic for the design of FDR based distributed detection framework in non-asymptotic cases. Hence, we
explored other possible distance measures that can better serve as design heuristics. Through empirical
studies and analytical justifications, we showed that system performance can be improved by the use
of Kolmogorov-Smirnov distance as the design heuristic. The advantage of using distance measures is
the simplicity associated with its implementation in practice. The optimization is performed offline by
finding the optimal parameter value through brute-force search as illustrated through simulations in this
paper. The only computationally expensive step in evaluating the optimal parameter value is computation
of count distribution under G0 and G1. Under G0, it takes linear time to find the distribution since we
have the closed form expressions derived in the paper. Under G1, evaluating the distribution analytically
involves multi-dimensional integration and, therefore, is of polynomial time complexity. Note that the
distribution can also be approximated using Monte-Carlo runs. For a large number of sensors, we can
use the asymptotic expressions derived in the paper which can be computed in linear time. Also, the
distributed algorithm used in this framework reduces the energy and bandwidth consumption since the
local sensors only report their 1-bit decisions to the FC rather than their p-values.
We also explored the system in the presence of malicious sensors (Byzantines). We modeled the
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Byzantines’ attack strategy to ensure covertness in its behavior (since FDR value is still controlled at the
pre-determined threshold γ) while degrading the system performance in terms of detection probability.
We analyzed the system performance both theoretically and numerically. We observed that the optimal
parameter value for the system depends on the fraction of Byzantines present in the system. The system
performance degrades under severe attacks when fixed parameter values are used and, therefore, we
proposed an adaptive approach to improve the performance which degraded in the presence of Byzantines.
The sensors are deployed in a dynamically changing environment and, therefore, an adaptive scheme is
necessary to combat the adversaries in the network. The proposed scheme learns the fraction of Byzantines
present in the network and adaptively changes system parameter values to improve the global detection
performance.
There are several directions for future work on this problem. One could explore other distance measures
[34] that can be used as heuristics for system design. The optimal attack strategy for the Byzantines needs
to be derived as it would be interesting to see how the performance of the network depends on the optimal
attack strategy of the Byzantines defined by hopt(·). Here, we considered the Neyman-Pearson framework.
This work could be extended to a Bayesian framework where the problem is to detect the presence of
a random target. For this, one may need to employ the Bayesian version of FDR called Bayesian FDR
[40] or pFDR [41]. In [40], an approach for control of Bayesian FDR has been proposed which can be
used to design local sensor thresholds in distributed detection under the Bayesian framework similar to
[1] and the present work.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION V.2
For a Gaussian random variable N(φ, 1), the pdf of a p-value u of a true sensor observation located
at a radial distance r from the target is given by
f(u; r) = exp
(
−φ
2
2
)
exp(φQ−1(u)), 0 ≤ u ≤ 1 (27)
where φ = 0 if r > d0 and φ =
√
P0 if r ≤ d0. The marginal pdf of the p-values in the presence of
target can be found as
fU(u) =
∫ d0
0
exp
(
−P0
2
)
exp(
√
P0Q
−1(u))fR(r)dr +
∫ R
d0
fR(r)dr (28)
=
d20
R2
exp
(
−P0
2
)
exp(
√
P0Q
−1(u)) +
(
1− d
2
0
R2
)
(29)
where fR(r) = 2rR2 for 0 ≤ r ≤ R has been used.
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This gives the marginal pdf of the transformed p-values v as
fV (v) =


fU (v) if i is an honest sensor
fU (1− v) if i is a Byzantine sensor
(30)
Under the assumption of independent p-values of the sensor observations, the transformed p-values v
are also independent. The FDR control algorithm requires ordering of these transformed p-values denoted
by v1,N ≤ v2,N · · · ≤ vN,N and are correlated (due to the ordering) with joint pdf given by
fV1,NV2,N ···VN,N = N !fV1(v1)fV2(v2) · · · fVN (vN ) 0 ≤ v1,N ≤ v2,N ≤ · · · ≤ vN,N (31)
where the marginal density fVi(vi) is given by (30)
These ordered transformed p-values are compared against linearly decreasing thresholds to get the
number of detections and, therefore, the probability can be found as
P (∆ = i;G1) =
∫ 1
vN,N=γ
· · ·
∫ vi+2,N
vi+1,N=(i+1)γ/N
∫ iγ/N
vi,N=0
· · ·
∫ v2,N
v1,N=0
N !fV1(v1)fV2(v2) · · · fVN (vN )dv1,Ndv2,N · · · dvN,N (32)
However, since any of the M sensors can be Byzantines, we need to take an average over the
(
N
M
)
possibilities which gives the desired result.
For a large number of sensors, we can derive the approximate distribution of the count statistic ∆ under
G1 using the result by Genovese and Wasserman [42] which states that asymptotically the Benjamini-
Hochberg method corresponds to classifying as H1 all p-values that are less than a particular threshold
v∗, where v∗ is the solution to the equation
F (v) = βv (33)
and
β =
1
γ −A0
1−A0 (34)
Here F (v) is the c.d.f of the transformed p-values under H1 and is assumed to be strictly concave, and A0
is the fraction of true H0s. This threshold v∗ is found by assuming a mixture model of the distribution of
p-values. For honest sensors, FH(v) = Q(Q−1(v)−φ) and for Byzantine sensors FB(v) = 1−Q(Q−1(1−
v)−φ), where φ = √P0. So, under the mixture model, we have F (v) = αFB(v)+ (1−α)FH(v). For a
large ROI, on an average d20/R2 fractions of sensors receive the signal, and therefore A0 = 1− d20/R2.
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Hence, the average probability of detection of an honest sensor is given by
p¯HD = (1−A0)P (V < v∗|H1) +A0P (V < v∗|H0) (35)
= (1−A0)
∫ v∗
0
fφ(u)du+A0v
∗ (36)
where fφ(u) is given by
fφ(u) = exp
(
−φ
2
2
)
exp(φQ−1(u)), 0 ≤ u ≤ 1 (37)
Similarly, the probability of detection of a Byzantine sensor is given by
p¯BD = (1−A0)P (V < v∗|H1) +A0P (V < v∗|H0) (38)
= (1−A0)P (1− U < v∗|H1) +A0P (1− U < v∗|H0) (39)
= (1−A0)
∫ 1
1−v∗
fφ(u)du+A0v
∗ (40)
The probability of ∆ = i detections (counts) when the target is present is provided by
P (∆ = i;G1) =
min (M,i)∑
k=max (0,M−N+i)
(
M
k
)(
N −M
i− k
)
(p¯BD)
k(1− p¯BD)M−k(p¯HD)i−k(1− p¯HD)(N−M)−(i−k)
(41)
or
P (∆ = i;G1) =
(
N
i
)
(p¯D)
i(1− p¯D)N−i (42)
where p¯D is the average probability of detection of a sensor given by
p¯D = αp¯
B
D + (1− α)p¯HD (43)
Also, we can further approximate this expression using DeMoivre-Laplace theorem as a Gaussian
distribution
P (∆ = i;G1) ≈ 1√
2piNp¯D(1− p¯D)
exp(
(i−Np¯D)2
2Np¯D(1− p¯D) ) (44)
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